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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the sensitivity of the labour market decisions of workers close to
retirement with respect to the incentives created by public regulations. We improve upon the ex-
tensive prior literature on the effect of pension incentives on retirement in two ways. First, by
modeling the transitions between employment, unemployment and retirement in a simultaneous
manner, paying special attention to the transition from unemployment to retirement (which is par-
ticularly important in Spain). Second, by considering the inﬂuence of unobserved heterogeneity in
the estimation of the effect of our (carefully constructed) incentive variables.
Using administrative data, we ﬁnd that, when properly deﬁned, economic incentives have a
strongimpactonlabourmarketdecisionsinSpain. Unemploymentregulationsareshowntobepar-
ticularly inﬂuential for retirement behaviour, along with the more traditional determinants linked to
the pension system. Pension variables also have a major bearing on both workers’ reemployment
decisions and on the strategic actions of employers. The quantitative impact of the incentives, how-
ever, is greatly affected by the existence of unobserved heterogeneity among workers. Its omission
leads to sizable biases in the assessment of the sensitivity to economic incentives, a ﬁnding that
has clear consequences for the credibility of any model-based policy analysis. We conﬁrm the
importance of this potential problem in one especially interesting instance: the reform of early
retirement provisions undertaken in Spain in 2002. We use a difference-in-difference approach to
measure the behavioural reaction to this change, ﬁnding a large overestimation when unobserved
heterogeneity is not taken into account.
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11 Introduction
All around the world, demographic aging is expected to produce signiﬁcant changes in the size and
composition of the labour force. In the European Union, for instance, the old-age dependency ratio
is projected to more than double from 25.4% to 53.5% over the 2008/2060 period.1 As a result, the
overall labour force in the EU is expected to decrease by as much as 13.6%, equivalent to around
24.4 million people (if compared with the number in 2007). This type of severe predicted labour
shortages is in no way solely applicable to European countries. According to the 2008 UN population
projections, old-age dependency ratios will increase in 2000/2050 by almost 50 percentage points in
Japan, by almost 30 pp in China, and around 15 pp in the United States.2 Seen in this perspective, the
labour imbalances created by the latest cyclical downturn 2007/2009 (most visibly in countries like
the USA where the unemployment rate has doubled over this period, and Spain and Ireland whose
unemployment rates have skyrocketed to ﬁgures well above 10%) look like a transitory phenomena.
In our view, the real challenge for future governments will most probably lie in attracting older
individuals back to the labour force rather than the opposite. Actually, most of the policy reforms
recently implemented clearly point in this direction3. Succeeding in this endeavour requires a better
understanding of labour supply than that achieved so far, specially regarding the ability of policy
makers to inﬂuence individual behaviour via incentives (ie. by changing the institutional environment
without imposing speciﬁc choices on individuals).
In this paper we contribute to this inquiry in three ways. First, by exploring the labour supply
of both employees and unemployed workers of advanced age. In our view, the latter group has
been somewhat overlooked in previous research, despite being large enough to make a signiﬁcant
contribution to labour supply in a number of OECD countries4. Secondly, we carefully model the
variables that capture the complex incentives provided by public institutions. For example, access to
high quality administrative data means we can ensure that public beneﬁts are only applied to those
in the sample who comply with all the entitlement requirements. Finally, we contribute by explicitly
considering multispell data and including unobserved heterogeneity in the assessment of the impact
of ﬁnancial incentives.Note that our analysis is centered on Spanish data, but the methodology and the
lessons obtained are of far broader applicability. As detailed below, Spain is an interesting case study
for this analysis thanks to the rather extreme incentives provided in its pension and unemployment
insurance programs, but similar institutions are found elsewhere.5
The empirical literature exploring the retirement behaviour of employed workers with reduced-
form models constitutes a natural reference point for this work.6 Loosely speaking, the methodology
employed involves two steps: the measurement of the key incentive variables and, in a second step,
the quantiﬁcation of their inﬂuence on retirement decisions via reduced-form econometric analysis.
Examples of descriptive analyses of pension systems, their ﬁnancial incentives and their impact on
behaviour can be found in eg. Gruber & Wise (1999) or Casey et al., (2003). As for the formal
estimation of econometric models including incentive variables as key regressors, Samwick (1998);
Borsch-Supan (2000) or Belloni & Alessie (2009) illustrate the development of this branch of the
literature. The Spanish case has also received a great deal of attention, as exempliﬁed by Boldrin et
al. (1999), Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın & S´ anchez-Mart´ ın (2004, 2007) or Cair´ o-Blanco (2010). A signiﬁcant
1Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2009) page 24. The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of
people aged 65 or above relative to the working-age population aged 15-64.
2Some recent research cast some doubts over the long-term predictions of the dependency ratios, see Sanderson & Scherbov
(2010)
3The widespread delays in normal retirement ages (specially for women) in OECD countries is a good example. See eg.
Whiteford & Whitehouse (2006)
4They represent an important fraction of the labour force aged 50-64 in 2009: for example, 7.5 percent of the LF in
Germany, 6 in the UK, 6.8 in France, and 11.3 in Spain. Source: European Labour Force Survey.
5The disincentive to work stems from the combination of early retirement, generous unemployment protection and a per-
missive attitude towards the search effort of the unemployed approaching retirement. This framework is shared by a large
number of European and OECD countries.
6A parallel structural literature is not covered in this paper. Mira & Aguirregabiria (2010) is an excellent survey of the
econometrics of dynamic discrete choice structural models.
2(although somewhat weaker than expected) inﬂuence of ﬁnancial incentives on retirement from em-
ployment is the typical conclusion of these studies (see, for example, Gruber & Wise (2004)). Our
work expands this literature in several dimensions.
First, we joint a recent literature that incorporates into the analysis the labour supply patterns
of the unemployed and the determinants of the transition from unemployment into retirement. In
the US, Coile and Levine (2006) explore the inﬂuence of changes in the labor market conditions and
unemployment beneﬁts on retirement. In a more recent paper (Coile and Levine (2009)) they evaluate
the relative impact of changes in the labor market conditions vs changes in the value of wealth.
Ben´ ıtez-Silva and Ni (2010) focus on the determinants of the job search of individuals approaching
or having reached retirement. These papers are especially relevant after the surge in unemployment
in US caused by the latest cyclical downturn. Here we extend these analyses to an economy with
even higher incidence of unemployment: Spain. Based on a new sample of administrative records
from the Spanish Social Security (MCVL) we explore the impact of the ﬁnancial incentives implicit
in the Spanish regulations on the retirement and reentry decisions of both employed and unemployed
workers.7 We also explore the transition into unemployment, bearing in mind the possible strategic
use of unemployment insurance as an early retirement device.
Spain is a particularly interesting case because of the strong incentives embedded in public regu-
lations. Early retirement penalties provide a clear illustration of the type of problems involved. Under
the standard program, the early claiming of the pension beneﬁt is only possible over the age of 60,
and subject to rather severe penalties.8 This is a clear deterrent for employees, but has unintended
consequences for the unemployed. In Spain, the unemployment insurance authority provides a cash
beneﬁt of 60-70% of the previous wage (for up to two years) and pays social contributions to the
Social Security. It is, also, remarkably tolerant regarding the search effort demanded from its reg-
istered unemployed.9 This is, therefore, a textbook example of moral hazard problems, created by
the interaction of pension and unemployment regulations: for a large number of unemployed, the
optimal response is to stay unemployed without searching while accumulating pension rights (ie. be-
ing effectively early retired but still being paid as if they were looking for jobs).10 Inefﬁciencies of
this type are common across OECD countries. Germany and France, for instance, combine a gener-
ous unemployment beneﬁt with an exemption from job seeking before the Early retirement age (60).
Unsurprisingly, the early retirement route via unemployment is very popular in both countries (see
chapters 3 and 4 in Gruber and Wise (1999). In this paper we quantify the behavioural consequences
of this and other regulations and their contribution to the generation of an alternative exit route out of
the labour force. Our quantitative ﬁndings apply only to the Spanish case, but the general message is
of much wider applicability.
A second contribution of our work is more methodological: the explicit inclusion of unobserved
heterogeneity in a multiple spell multi-state competing risk model. We think of this as a relevant im-
provement because the omission of unobservable differences in preferences and individual-speciﬁc
labour market characteristics can easily bias the estimated results on the effect of ﬁnancial incentives
over individual behaviour. An example may illustrate this point. In countries with generous mini-
mum pensions, they usually take the blame for the peak in retirement hazard observed at the Early
Retirement Age (60 in Spain).11 However, it may be the case that the observed peaks are entirely
due to a composition effect. They may reﬂect the existence of a group of people whose unobservable
characteristics (preferences, non-labour wealth, etc.) lead them to coordinate retirement, typically
under the effect of credit constraints, at the age when pension beneﬁts are ﬁrst available.12 Most
7The MCVL database is an random extraction from the administrative register of the Spanish Social Security. As described
in section 3, it provides the complete labour history of more than one million workers in Spain.
8The pension is reduced by 7.5% for each year that the individual claims before the normal retirement age of 65.
9Strictly speaking, unemployed people in Spain cannot remain inactive according to the current legislation; Nonetheless,
the authorities largely turn a blind eye on this common practice.
10The unemployed aged 52 or older are entitled to a special unemployment program (UB52+) that provides an assistance
beneﬁt, once the individual contributive beneﬁts are exhausted. The beneﬁt can be enjoyed on a continuous basis until the
individual retires.
11Minimum pensions remove the ﬁnancial incentives to work provided by early retirement penalties and also increase life-
cycle wealth. See Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın & S´ anchez-Mart´ ın (2007) for more details. Also note that the existence of borrowing
constraints typically share some of the blame for the large early retirement hazards in the data.
12Gustmann and Steinmeier (2005) is a good example of this approach. The population is split into two groups according to
3likely, the two hypotheses are intertwined. If a high propensity to leave the workforce early is partly
the product of individual preferences, it will probably result in low life-cycle contributions and, con-
sequently, pension beneﬁts. This will make these workers qualiﬁed for the perception of minimum
pensions. In this paper we allow the two mechanisms to reveal themselves in the estimation process.
In particular, our estimation of the impact of ﬁnancial incentives includes the possible existence of
these unobserved differences among the individuals in the sample.
Our empirical strategy is based on the joint estimation of two duration models, one for the exit
from employment and another one for the exit from unemployment. We adopt a multiple risk ap-
proach with three destination states (employment, unemployment and retirement), and explicitly take
into account unobserved heterogeneity. The transition rates are speciﬁed in a ﬂexible way and are al-
lowed to depend on both observed and unobserved characteristics of the worker, as well as on the time
spent in the respective state. Consequently, we derive the joint likelihood of all the observed tran-
sitions each individual in the sample may go through, taking into account the effects of unobserved
factors in those transitions. The joint consideration of both the employment and unemployment spells
of the same worker is important in order to properly identify the effect of economic incentives over
their decisions of quitting from the job, searching for a new job or retiring (as employed or as unem-
ployed). It is important to control for unobserved heterogeneity, since lack of control of this problem
introduces biases in the coefﬁcients obtained from independent estimations of the different hazard
rates.
Our ﬁndings can be categorized in three groups. A ﬁrst set of results provides a robust conﬁrma-
tion of the importance of economic incentives. While the previous literature has struggled to conﬁrm
the size (and in some cases even the sign) of the incentive effects, our estimations are clearly consis-
tent with the theoretically expected value of the effects. We ﬁnd that the amount of disposable income
(in the current and alternative labour states), the amount of accrued pension rights and their change
with current decisions are all strong predictors of individual behaviour. The ﬁnancial opportunities
captured by our incentive variables stem from both the pension and the unemployment insurance sys-
tems. The cross-effects between the two systems are large: unemployment regulations are extremely
important for the timing of retirement, while pensions rules affect the transition between employ-
ment and unemployment (over and above the well-known effects on retirement). Finally, we ﬁnd
that, in addition to the effect on individual decisions, public policies also seem to have an inﬂuence
on the timing of the ﬁring decisions made by the employers in our sample. A second set of results
stresses the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of the effects of
the incentives. Ignoring this heterogeneity leads to sizable biases in the quantiﬁcation of the effect
of incentives. For example, the tendency to quickly change states with a low disposable income is
underestimated if unobserved heterogeneity is ignored. At the same time, we show that the peak
in the retirement hazard at the normal retirement age is created by the coexistence of several types
of workers with markedly different retirement propensities. Ignoring this possibility will lead to an
overestimation of the sensitivity to pension rules (once individuals reach the age of 65).
Finally, we assess the extent to which policy makers can alter aggregate labour behaviour by
changing the economic incentives. We undertake two policy experiments with our simulated model,
exploring the consequences of modifying the pension and/or unemployment regulations. First we use
the model to explore the consequences of the change in early retirement rules in 2002 in Spain. Using
a difference-in-difference approach we ﬁnd a sizable impact of the new early retirement provisions
(shifting the initial retirement age from 60 to 61) on the retirement decisions of the affected workers
and on the ﬁring decisions of employers. In a second experiment we evaluate the effects of a further
tightening of the pension/unemployment legislation. We simulate a cut in the length of time beneﬁts
are available and a reduction in the pace of accumulation of pension rights during the unemployment
spell. These changes lead to large increases in the predicted reemployment and retirement hazard
rates, with gains ranging between 10 and 20% of the initial hazard, depending on age.
the time-discount factor. As a result, early retirement is less dependent (although not completely independent) on the ﬁnancial
incentives provided by the Social Security system.
4The structure of the paper is as follows. Firstly,in section 2 we present the theoretical back-
ground in order to understand the main behavioural components of our empirical approach. Section
3 presents the data we use, reviewing the main descriptive statistics of our estimation sample and
other relevant empirical evidence. We then proceed to present our econometric techniques in section
4. Section 5 presents the main results of the analysis and section 6 presents some policy simulations.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Rational retirement behaviour
In this section we explore the determinants of the optimal retirement decisions made by both em-
ployees and unemployed workers. This provides the rationale for our choices of regressors in the
econometric analysis of section 4.
Consideranemployedworkerﬁrst. Atage¿, theworkerisconsideringwhethertostayemployed
or to retire (i.e. to leave the labour force).13 We represent current labour income by w(¿) and the
pension available in case of retirement by B(¿). If the worker decides to stay employed at age ¿, the
marginal change in their life-cycle wealth, y0 is:
y0(¿) =
½
w(¿)(1 ¡ &) + B0(¿)A(60) if ¿ < 60
w(¿)(1 ¡ &) ¡ B(¿) + B0(¿)A(¿) if ¿ ¸ 60 (1)
where & stands for the pay-roll tax rate, B0 is the marginal change in the value of the pension beneﬁt
in case the individual continues working and A is a constant that measures (in expected, discounted
terms) the length of the period during which the individual enjoys the extra pension obtained. Note
that we are taking 60 as the Early Retirement Age. Equation (1) shows how, before the Normal
Retirement Age, typical workers can increase income by delaying retirement. The gains are both
immediate (in as far as current net labour income exceeds the pension beneﬁt) and differed in time
(later retirement means smaller early retirement penalties, resulting in larger pensions in the future).
“Financial” incentives, therefore, favor delaying retirement until, at least, the Normal Retirement
Age. This general observation, however, depends on the details of the pension formula and the indi-
vidual circumstances of the worker (as further discussed below). Besides, the beneﬁts of retirement
go beyond purely economic incentives, as people enjoy the opportunities derived from alternative
uses of time. By labeling all those beneﬁts together as “leisure”, l, the optimal retirement can be
easily framed as an intertemporal income-vs-leisure choice. To be more speciﬁc we assume individu-
als’ relative preferences for consumption/leisure at a point in time are captured by a separable utility
function U(t) = u(c(t)) + º(l(t)). By solving a standard life-cycle problem (see Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın &
S´ anchez-Mart´ ın (2007)), it can be shown that it is optimal to stop working at age ¿¤ if:14
¸¤ y0(¿¤) < ¢º(¿¤) (2)
where ¸¤ is the marginal utility of wealth (the lagrange multiplier of the problem when ¿ = ¿¤) and
¢º stands for the change in utility generated by the increase in leisure after retirement. In words,
equation (2) says it is optimal to stop when the welfare gain derived from working (expressed in
utility terms by multiplying the “ﬁnancial” change y0 by ¸) does not compensate for the utility value
of the forgone leisure.
Our empirical exercise explores the connection between the observed variability in retirement
ages and the observed variability on the left hand side of equation (2), controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity.15 More precisely, we will construct a set of regressors that capture the variability in
13In this brief explanation of the individual’s decisions we leave aside the risk of being ﬁred or any other of the uncertainties
suffered at the end of the professional career. This is for expositional simplicity: in our empirical application we do include
the probability of being separated from the job.
14More generally, the optimal retirement age, ¿¤, for a worker planning at age t0 is characterized by the ﬁrst order condition:
¸e¡r (¿¤¡t0) y0(¿¤) ¡ e¡±(¿¤¡t0) ¢º(¿¤) = 0
15Note that the variability in ¸y0(¿) is brought about both by the time and cross-section variability in individual character-
istics and the time variability in pension rules.
5the ﬁnancial incentives y0(t) generated by Spanish pension rules. First, we develop the expression of
the ﬁnancial incentives (1) a bit further by including the details of the pension formula:
B(¿) =
½
®(¿)w(¿) if B(¿) > Bm
Bm if B(¿) · Bm
In Spain, the individual pension is obtained by combining three main ingredients (see Appendix
A.1 for the main details of the Spanish Pension System):




(ii) ®(¿), a replacement rate that combines penalties for early retirement and for an insufﬁcient
number of contributed years.
(iii) Bm, a guaranteed minimum pension beneﬁt.
Note, in particular, that B0(¿) is 0 when the individual is drawing the minimum pension and
®0(¿)w(¿)+®(¿)w0(¿) otherwise. ®0(¿) is a non-linear function of the age and of the length of the
individual’s contributive record; w0(¿) reﬂects the changing slope of gross labour income during the
life cycle ie. w0(¿) = w(¿) ¡ w(¿ ¡ D). Taking all the above into account, we can obtain detailed
expressions for the ﬁnancial incentives experienced at different ages. Before the Early Retirement
Age the expression is:
y0(¿) =
½
w(¿)(1 ¡ &) if B(¿) · Bm
w(¿)(1 ¡ &) + A(60)®0(¿)w(¿) + A(60)®(¿)w0(¿) otherwise
¸
(3)
while after the Early Retirement Age, the incentives take the form:
y0(¿) =
½
w(¿)(1 ¡ &) ¡ Bm if B(¿) · Bm
w(¿)(1 ¡ &) + [A(¿)®0(¿) ¡ ®(¿)]w(¿) + A(¿)®(¿)w0(¿) otherwise (4)
We use these equations to formulate our econometric model (see equation (5) below), but we
explore ﬁrst how they change when we model the behaviour of unemployed workers.
Unemployed workers
The optimal behaviour of the unemployed is harder to model, but the trade-offs involved in retirement
decisions are not very different from those described above. Retirement is still a trade-off between
current and future income and leisure, and can be formally captured by expressions similar to (2)
and (3)-(4) 16. In general, the same mechanisms that prevent employees from retiring operate in the
case of the unemployed, with the (probably unintended) consequence of prolonging the duration of
the unemployment spells. This tendency is limited by the dependence of the unemployment beneﬁts
on the duration of the unemployment spells (see Appendix A.2 for the details of the Spanish UB
System):
² The cash beneﬁt provided by the Unemployment Services, b, is a decreasing function of the
length of the spell. Roughly speaking, it amounts to 70% of the previous gross wage in the ﬁrst
6 months of the spell; 60% in the ensuing year and a half and a subsistence subsidy thereafter.
16Simple expressions of the ﬁnancial incentives miss the uncertainty and complexities involved in the process of searching
for a new job. We refer the interested reader to Garcia-Perez & Sanchez Mart´ ın (2009), where a formal analysis of the optimal
retirement and search behaviour of the unemployed can be found. In the empirical speciﬁcation use in the present paper, the
options opened to the unemployed are captured by a set of individual characteristics (eg. level of qualiﬁcations and age) and a
set of variables reﬂecting the state of the labour market.
6² Similarly, the Unemployment Services protect the future income of the unemployed by pay-
ing their social contributions to the Social Security System according to the worker’s previous
wage. In this way, they prevent a very unfavorable updating of w while the worker is unem-
ployed. This protection is, however, provided solely during the ﬁrst two years of the unem-
ployment spell as a maximum.17
All in all, equations (3)-(4) are still valid with the substitution of unemployment beneﬁts, b, for
net wages, w(¿)(1¡&), and keeping in mind the dependence b and the change in pension rights w0(¿)
have on the duration of the unemployment spell.
Empirical speciﬁcation
Guided by the expressions above, our empirical approach will be based on the following expression:
P(¿) = ¯1 Inc(¿) + ¯2 ®(¿) + ¯3 w(¿) + ¯4 w0(¿) + ¯5 Y (¿) + °0Z + ² (5)
Where P(¿) is the probability of retirement which, in our empirical application, means being classi-
ﬁed as retired by the Social Security administration. This equation includes the following regressors:
- Current income Inc, ie. current labour income if employed, w(¿) or unemployment beneﬁts b
if unemployed.
- The pension replacement rate associated with the length of the individual’s contributive record
®(¿).18
- The accrued pension rights, w(¿).
- The change in pension rights, w0(¿).
- A proxy of life-cycle wealth, Y (¿), included as a determinant of the marginal utility of wealth,
¸. More precisely, larger values of Y (¿) imply lower values of ¸ and a stronger valuation of
leisure versus income. For a formal understanding, it should be remembered that according to
equation (2) it is best to retire when y0(¿) < ¢º(¿¤)=¸.
- A set of other variables, Z, including information on demographic characteristics and previous
labour market experiences. This information acts as proxy for the dis-utility of work (and
the reemployment opportunities of the unemployed). For the unemployed we also allow for a
direct effect of the duration of the unemployment spell (over and above the impact of duration
on beneﬁts and the update of pension rights).
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 The data set
We use Spanish administrative data from the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL). This
data set is based on a random draw from the Social Security archives. Each year, it provides a
sample of 4% among all the afﬁliated workers, employed or otherwise, and pensioners in that year.
The MCVL reports information for about 1:1 million people on their personal characteristics and
employment and unemployment spells throughout their entire labour history. Here we use the 2008
wave, supplemented by the employment histories of workers present only in some of the previous
three waves (2005-2007).
For each worker, we have the date when each job begins and ends. This provides us with quite de-
tailed information about employment duration. Periods of unemployment can also be identiﬁed from
17From then on the Unemployment Services pays only the minimum contribution on behalf of the worker who has access
to non-contributive Unemployment Beneﬁts.
18Note that the replacement rate is also a function of age. As we are including age as an independent regressor, we make ®
represent just the penalties derived from an insufﬁcient number of contributive years.
7the dates when the ﬁrm ceases to pay Social Security contributions for the worker. Furthermore, we
can differentiate between unemployment spells in which the worker receives Unemployment Beneﬁts
(those in which payroll taxes are paid) and those which correspond to both periods of unemployment
without beneﬁts or periods of inactivity (those in which worker contributions to Social Security are
not paid). Moreover, we know whether the Unemployment Beneﬁts are contributive (corresponding
to the Unemployment Insurance system, which pays beneﬁts to workers who have previously con-
tributed when employed) or assistance ones (corresponding to the Unemployment Assistance system,
which pays workers who have exhausted previous ones or do not qualify for receiving them).19 Given
that we have the complete labour history of the worker, we can also get the entitlement period for
each beneﬁt spell.
The main shortcoming of this data set is the lack of certain personal or family characteristics,
such as marital status or number of children, which could be important to determine, for example, the
exact amount the worker may receive from Unemployment Beneﬁts. Another important caveat is that
we cannot measure the educational level of the worker, but only the qualiﬁcation level of the previous
job held. Hence, our measure of qualiﬁcation has to be taken with caution as it does not reﬂect the
actual level of qualiﬁcation of the worker but the one corresponding to the job previously occupied.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Our estimation sample includes the complete labour career (from the age of 50 onward) for a sample
of 42,117 workers in the period 1988-2008. Each of these workers may have both some employment
and unemployment spells. The ﬁrst important difference emerges by comparing these workers in their
ﬁrst observation in our sample, that is, when they are 50. In that observation, the worker may be either
employed or unemployed. Those workers who are initially employed have more stable labour careers
(around 3.7 previous employment spells, whereas this ﬁgure is 5.3 for those initially unemployed).
They have access also to larger life-cycle income (13,941 vs. 9,730 euros). Finally their qualiﬁcation
level is higher (56.4% are working in a qualiﬁed job vs. 44.5% among the initially unemployed).
For the workers in our sample, we are able to analyze 22,640 unemployment spells and 52,764
employment spells. Among them, 12,160 unemployment spells and 13,140 employment spells are
taking place when the worker is aged 60 or over.
Finally, almost 50% of the sample of workers have at least one unemployment spell and one
employment spell. For the rest of the sample we have just one employment spell that ﬁnishes either
in unemployment or retirement, 39.4%, or just one unemployment spell that ﬁnishes in a new job or
retirement, 15.7%.
In Tables 1 and 2 we present the main descriptive statistics for the spells over the age of 6020 as
well as the main characteristics of the workers included in our estimation sample. These tables feature
all completed and censored employment and unemployment spells,21 distinguishing between those
that ﬁnish in a new job (or in unemployment, in the case of employment spells) and those that end up
in retirement. Beginning with unemployment spells, Table 1 shows that the access to Unemployment
Beneﬁts (UB) is quite general in our sample. Only fewer than 20% of all completed unemployment
spells begin with neither contributive nor assistance beneﬁts. Moreover, the possibility of having the
maximum level of contributive beneﬁts, truncated UB, is quite likely, especially among those who
ﬁnish by entering retirement. As it is to be expected, qualiﬁed workers are much more likely to be
entitled to the maximum level of unemployment beneﬁts. The rest of the parameters determining the
pension level also constitute a quite relevant set of variables which show substantial variation among
unemployment spells. Those entitled to a minimum pension are much more prone to retire after
unemployment, with the pension rights of these workers being the largest among all unemployed.
Furthermore, the previous wage of these workers, e1,586 , is also the largest among all unemploy-
ment spells. This is the basic explanation for the aforementioned fact about the access to truncated
UB. Finally, the change in pension rights throughout the unemployment spell seems to be smaller for
19See Bover et al., (2002) for details.
20Those for the spells before age 60 are available upon request. They are basically showing the same ﬁgures although, of
course, the economic variables are in a somewhat lower level than they show once the worker is older.
21More than 70% of all observed unemployment spells are not censored and almost 43% of the employment spells are also
completed spells.







At the beginning of the Unempl. spell:
Without Unempl. Beneﬁts 34.15% 19.51% 19.45%
With Truncated Unempl Beneﬁts 20.03% 39.02% 28.63%
With non-truncated Unempl. Beneﬁts 32.48% 26.27% 41.60%
With Unempl. Subsidy 13.34% 15.20% 10.31%
At the end of the Unempl. Spell:
Without Unempl. Beneﬁts 58.79% 43.53% 68.06%
With Truncated Unempl Beneﬁts 9.05% 25.14% 11.22%
With non-truncated Unempl. Beneﬁts 18.51% 17.64% 13.49%
With Unempl. Subsidy 13.65% 13.70% 7.22%
Pension Rights 10,261 e 8,824 e 11,983 e
Change in Pension Rights -1,282e -420e -1,846e
% with access to Minimum Pension 33.52% 25.14% 11.22%
Life-cycle income 10,648 e 9,598 e 10,830 e
Other individual characteristics:
Qualiﬁed worker 52.41% 41.09% 46.20%
Voluntary exit from previous job 23.90% 11.07% 16.57%
Previous job duration. years 6.35 4.35 7.33
Number of previous employment spells 3.61 5.71 3.45
Number. of observations 1.912 533 9.715
those who decide to return to a new job, being almost zero among censored unemployment spells.
Thus, it is quite clear that leaving unemployment is negatively correlated with this variable. Table 1
also has some other individual variables related to the previous job of the unemployed worker. We
can see, ﬁrstly, that the previous job duration was longer than seven years for those who decide to
retire, after being unemployed, whereas this ﬁgure is less than ﬁve years for those who re-enter a
new job. In fact, the likelihood of entering unemployment by voluntary quitting is almost double
among the former than among the latter. Another signal that the labour history of workers exiting to
retirement is more stable is the number of previous employment spells of these unemployed workers:
this rate is around 3 for those who exit to retirement whereas it is almost 5 for those who re-enter
employment. Finally, we can see that the majority of unemployed workers are from very small ﬁrms,
with the exit to retirement being more likely among unemployed workers from big ﬁrms.
Table 2 presents the main characteristics of the employment spells included in our estimation
sample. As for unemployed workers, we ﬁnd that the entitlement to minimum pensions is a substan-
tial predictor of retirement. This ﬁgure is almost three times larger among those employed workers
who exit directly to retirement than for those who exit to unemployment. However the level of their
pension rights is not so different. In fact, those rights are slightly larger (e8.838 vs. e8.271) for
those who retire, although the largest pension rights are observed among those workers who are not
observed exiting from employment by the time the data were extracted, that is, among censored ob-
servations. The main observed difference between unemployed and employed workers is that the
change in pension rights among the latter is almost double the case of unemployed workers. Fur-
thermore, their wages are also somewhat higher: e1.744 for employed workers who exit directly to
retirement and e1.581 for those who exit to unemployment. In fact, the proportion of workers with
the maximum contribution base is more than 30% for retiring employed workers, which is another
clear signal that these workers are the ones in the best position in terms of all the parameters determin-
ing their pension level. The likelihood of being separated from the job and entering unemployment







Pension Rights 11,405e 10.353 e 10,694 e
Change in Pension Rights 932e 1,095 e 1,140 e
% with access to Minimum Pension 20.22% 21.04% 10.62%
Wage 1,868e 1,977 e 1,952e
Lify Cycle Income 13,968e 11,794e 11,924e
Qualiﬁed worker 58.89% 45.25% 55.39%
Job duration, in years 9.27 5.83 8.15
Number of previous employment spells 5.55 5.28 4.94
# of observations 5,539 3,779 3,822
is substantially larger in small ﬁrms whereas, as it was the case before, the likelihood of exiting to
retirement is larger within big ﬁrms. Finally, the previous employment history of workers exiting to
retirement is slightly more stable than for those who exit to unemployment although these differences
are quite small.

























Figure 1 shows what is the main four elements of our estimation strategy, the different hazard
rates conditional on age, that is, the conditional exit rates from one particular state to another one, for
each age in the relevant interval we are analyzing (50-68). We have the exit rate from employment
into the two possible alternative destinations: unemployment and retirement (without passing through
unemployment) and we also have the exit from unemployment to both a new job and into retirement.
With respect to age, we ﬁnd the typical results already well documented in the literature (See Jim´ enez-
Mart´ ın & S´ anchez-Mart´ ın (2004, 2007)): the exit to retirement is mainly at the normal retirement age,
65. But distinguishing between those who access to retirement with and without an unemployment
spell in the middle, a clear result is another important peak at the Early Retirement age, 60, but only
for those who are unemployed before drawing retirement beneﬁts.22 Conditional on age, the exit from
employment to unemployment is almost ﬂat, whereas the ﬂow in the other direction changes slightly
more with age: the likelihood of re-employment decreases with age until 60, being almost negligible
after that point, which may indicate how bad labour market opportunities are for older unemployed
workers.
Finally, Figure 2 show the same hazard rates albeit conditional on both employment and unem-
22Coile and Levine (2009) also ﬁnds a substantial difference in the retirement hazard rate for unemployed and employed
workers
10ployment duration, that is, they provide the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the conditional probability of
exiting from one particular state to another one, in each month of the corresponding employment
or unemployment spell. This ﬁgure shows that the ﬂows between employment and unemployment
decrease sharply according to the duration of employment and unemployment. This is quite standard
in the literature (see, for example, Mortensen (1986) for the exit from unemployment and Jovanovic
(1979) for the exit from employment). On the other hand, the exit from employment to retirement
is almost ﬂat and the exit from unemployment to retirement decreases with unemployment duration.
These ﬁgures provide one of our main stylized facts which is the important peak in the 24th month of
unemployment, both in the exit to a new job and into retirement. This is directly linked to the rules on
Unemployment Beneﬁts in Spain which sets the maximum duration for drawing such beneﬁts at two
years. Hence, the exhaustion of unemployment beneﬁts seems to be one of the main determinants
of such transition, although it also has a very important effect in the exit to a new job, especially for
qualiﬁed male workers.


























Our main objective is to study the hazard rate out of both employment and unemployment for all
workers in our sample. Given that our data are measured in quarterly terms, it is natural to use a
discrete-time duration model (See Lancaster (1990), or Jenkins (1995) for the basic features of such
models) where the hazard rate is given by the following conditional probability:
Á(t) = Pr(T = tjT ¸ t)
and T is a discrete random variable denoting the duration of either employment or unemployment.


















where x(t) denotes the vector of explanatory variables, some of them varying with the spell’s dura-
tion (t), j is a counter for the two possible destinations when exiting from unemployment (retirement,
ur, or re-employment, ue) and k is a counter for the destinations when exiting from employment (un-
employment, eu, or retirement, er). µ
j
0(t) and °k
0(t) represent the additive terms of the duration
dependence in the hazard rates, the baseline hazard, which will be estimated in the most general way
11as possible. Finally, µ
j
1(t) and °k
1(t) are the coefﬁcients for the explanatory factors which may de-
pend on duration. The last component in the hazard rate is unobserved heterogeneity. It is well known
that if this is not taken into account, we may incur in problematic inferences in so far as the rest of
parameter estimates may be inconsistent (Flinn and Heckman (1982)). For instance, as commented
before, the empirical hazard functions of unemployment decline steadily over duration in unemploy-
ment (See Figure 2). This implies that individuals have a higher probability of re-employment at
the beginning of their unemployment spell than afterwards. The same happens with the exit from
employment to unemployment: workers run a much larger risk of being made redundant when their
experience in the job is low than once they have gained experience, when the risk of leaving employ-
ment declines. Because of the possible existence of unobserved heterogeneity, this simple conclusion
may be wrong. Consider the case of two types of individuals: (a) “high risk” individuals who have
a high hazard rate out of employment; and (b) “low risk” individuals who have a low hazard rate out
of employment. Furthermore, suppose that for each group, the risk of leaving the job is constant over
time. If we ignore the fact that these individuals come from two separate and distinct groups (this is
what we do if we omit the —admittedly unobserved— predictor that distinguishes the two groups),
the hazards would fall given the existence of two such levels of risk. Thus, unobserved heterogene-
ity raises a serious interpretive problem. This same problem may exist when analyzing exits from
unemployment, as long as there are different groups of individuals who exit from unemployment at
different rates (according to some unobserved characteristics). This is the basic reason why both ´j
and ´k have to be considered when estimating our model.
As we are considering a competing risk framework, the exit from a given state (either unemploy-
ment or employment), is speciﬁed as:
Áu(t) = Áue(t) + Áur(t)
Áe(t) = Áeu(t) + Áer(t)
A natural speciﬁcation for this competing risk model is a multinomial one in which each risk
considers the exit to a particular destination state, conditional on not having exited to the alternative




0 (t) + µue
1 (t)x(t) + ´ue)
1 + exp(µue
0 (t) + µue
1 (t)x(t) + ´ue) + exp(µur
0 (t) + µur




0 (t) + µur
1 (t)x(t) + ´ur)
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There is a fairly signiﬁcant list of variables that should be taken into account when estimating
labour ﬂows to retirement (individual preferences, wealth, health status, family characteristics, etc.)
but some of them are totally unavailable to our study. This is the main reason why such unobserved
factors have to be properly controlled for. It may be the case that unobserved heterogeneity may
be correlated across unemployment and employment spells for the same individual. This is quite
sensible if the individual behaviour is affecting the different hazard rates in our model. Thus, in
order to allow for this correlation, we estimate both the unemployment and employment hazard rates
simultaneously, and assume that unobserved heterogeneity is present in both hazard rates. We assume
that such unobserved factors follow a discrete distribution function with different mass points (as in
Heckman & Singer (1984)). Accordingly, we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity component,
23An alternative way of specifying our competing risk model would be using a type-1 extreme-value distribution function
for function F ():This function, as stated in Meyer (1990) for example, allows testing whether the Mixed Proportional Hazard
assumption (see van den Berg (2001)) is veriﬁed in our data. However, the interpretation of the estimated effects is a bit more
complicated, given we have to use the coefﬁcients in both hazard rates to analyze the effect of each particular regressor. Given
this, we have opted for the multinomial model which is much easier to interpret. Moreover, as we are allowing for the presence
of unobserved heterogeneity, the problem of independent irrelevant alternatives is not a real issue in our model.
12´; is a discrete random variable with ﬁnite support given by r mass points s1;:::;sr. There are four
potential heterogeneity components, ´eu; ´ue; ´er; ´ur, each of them associated with one transition
in the model. However we assume equal heterogeneity for transitions between employment and
unemployment, ´eu = ´ue = ´u, and also for transitions regarding retirement, ´er = ´ur = ´r:
We refer to ´u and ´r as the unemployment component and the retirement component, respectively.
We allow for two different levels of ´u for the hazard rates between employment and unemployment,
(su
1;su
2); and another two levels for the exit from both employment and unemployment to retirement,
(sr
1;sr
2). A given individual, therefore, may have, for example, a high exit rate from unemployment to
a new job and a low exit rate from unemployment to retirement. Hence, we estimate the probability
of each of the four possibilities allowed in this speciﬁcation: Pr(´u = su
1;´r = sr
1) = P11; Pr(´u =
su
1;´r = sr
2) = P12; Pr(´u = su
2;´r = sr
1) = P21 and Pr(´u = su
2;´r = sr
2) = P22:24
Given all these assumptions, employment and unemployment spells cannot be treated separately
when estimating the model. Thus, we need to specify the likelihood function for all spells and inte-
grate out the random effects (see Cheser and Lancaster (1983) for a detailed discussion). That is, the
likelihood function for individual i subject to unobserved heterogeneity ´u
` in the ﬂow rates between
employment and unemployment and ´r
































































In this expression ti is the last observed period for individual i, uit = 1 if during the period t
a spell of unemployment is observed for individual i and zero if a spell of employment is observed
in such period. Finally yue
it is an indicator of whether the individual i exits from unemployment to
employment in period t and the same, albeit changing the origin and the destination state, for the
other three variables of this type.
A ﬁnal important remark is that, as reported in Abbring and van den Berg (2003), the availability
of multiple employment and/or unemployment spells for the individuals in our sample ensures the
identiﬁcation of all parameters in our model, given we have enough variation in the observed regres-
sors, x(t), across the spells for each individual. Moreover, as we can think of the baseline hazards
in each exit rate as being speciﬁc to certain values of x(t), for example Unemployment Beneﬁts, we
will be able to better identify and test for some duration dependence in the effect of such regressors
over each exit rate.
4.1 The problem of initial conditions
As usual in models of this type, and given we are working with older workers, the initial observed
period does not correspond to the date of entry into the labour market. The previous labour market
history of the workers in the sample is therefore unobserved for the econometrician and possibly
correlated with the rest of unobserved heterogeneity. Consequently we have to consider the problem
of initial conditions. In this sense, we specify the joint distribution of all outcomes -including that in
the initial time period- conditional on unobserved heterogeneity. Within this framework, this means
specifying the distribution of the initial condition given unobserved heterogeneity. In this sense, we
also estimate a process for each individual being employed or unemployed in the ﬁrst observation
and we make this process conditional on certain observed worker characteristics and also on the
unobserved heterogeneity. We shall therefore add the following extra term to expression (1):
£
ui0 log(1 ¡ h0
i(su





24Of course, we have to estimate only three different probabilities given that P22 = 1 ¡ P11 ¡ P12 ¡ P21:
13where h0
i(su
`) is the process for the initial condition that will be estimated using a logit speciﬁcation.
We assume that this process depends only on the unemployment component of unobserved hetero-
geneity. This is sensible given that initial conditions basically consider the probability of the worker
being employed or unemployed at the beginning of the observed period.
5 Results
In this section we review the ﬁndings obtained in the maximum likelihood estimation of the model
of labour transitions in section 4, using a sample of workers between 50 and 68 years old. Our
main interest is in the transitions observed after the age 60, ie. once retirement is a relevant option
for the worker. The spells before the age of 60 are essentially used to identify the distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity in the sample, which is assumed to be constant through time for each
individual. Consequently the results for the transitions between unemployment and employment
before the age of 60, together with the results for the initial conditions process, are conﬁned to Tables
A2-A4 in the Appendix.
We start by reviewing the estimated distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in section 5.1. We
then introduce our estimation of the determinants of the transitions originated from unemployment
(section 5.2) and employment (section 5.3). A brief discussion of the differences in the estimations
with and without unobserved heterogeneity is left to appendix B.
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5.1 The importance of unobserved heterogeneity
Our estimation procedure uncovers three different types of individuals in terms of employment-
unemployment transitions and two basic types in terms of the exits to retirement (table 3 and ﬁgure
14Table 3: The Estimated Unobserved Heterogeneity Distribution Function
Coef. T Stat. E/U transit. transit. to R
Pr(´u = 0;´r = sr) 28.74% 6.51 low low
Pr(´u = su;´r = 0) 19.52% 11.24 high high
Pr(´u = su;´r = sr) 51.74% high low
su 0.6474 15.55
sr -3.7199 -53.10
3). Note that we introduce an empirically motivated, ex-ante constraint in the distribution of unob-
served heterogeneity: our ﬁrst mass point (the one with location points su
1 and sr
1) is assumed to have








Around 19.5% of the sample is made up of individuals characterized by a very large propensity
to change their labour state, both in the exit to retirement and in the transitions between employment
and unemployment. This group is identiﬁed with the label “ U/E high + R high” and by a red line in
the graphs in ﬁgure 3. The rest of the population shows a much larger attachment to the workforce,
with a very low estimated hazard rate into retirement. Within this group, in contrast, there are strong
differences in the propensity to change between employment and unemployment: around 51.7% of
thepopulationhavelowexitratesintoretirementbuthighemployment-unemploymenttransitionrates
(group “ U/E high + R low” and green line in ﬁgure 3), while the remaining 28.7% of the population
have both low retirement and employment-unemployment hazard rates (group “ U/E low + R low”
and blue line).
Hence, around 1 out of 5 workers in the sample may be deﬁned as very mobile individuals, with
a very high intrinsic propensity to switch back and forth between employment states, and also to
change from inside the workforce into retirement. This intrinsic mobility should be the result of a
combination of different characteristics that we cannot directly observe in our data set. Economic
theory suggests some of those possible unobservable factors. At the individual level, the high retire-
ment propensity points towards high time discounting, high risk aversion, high valuation of leisure
and a relatively low life expectancy; It may also be associated to a large stock of non-human wealth,
maybe due to the receipt of sizable severance payments after departure from previous job spells. At
the ﬁrm level, the high turnover may reﬂect job matches with high termination risks; The high ro-
tation across employment spells is shared by a second population group, adding up to 51.7% of the
total population (ie, the largest group in terms of size) which is characterized by low exit rates into
retirement and high employment-unemployment transition rates.
These two groups of workers have large exit rates from unemployment to employment and, more
signiﬁcantly, larger ﬁring rates, especially before the age of 65. These workers should be attracting
more offers, when unemployed, or should have lower reservation wages, making them more willing
to return to the workforce. The larger ﬁring rates could be connected to certain job-speciﬁc or ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics, but also to a more systematic strategic use of the unemployment beneﬁts for
voluntary relocations or early retirement. What seems unquestionable from our estimation results is
that the unobserved determinants behind a high propensity to retire should be different from those
behind a large employment/unemployment mobility, the latter being more closely linked to job and
ﬁrm characteristics than the former.
25The combination of low exit rates between employment and unemployment and, at the same time, large hazard rates into
retirement seems to be extremely rare in our sample.
26In fact, given that we have a constant term in each of the hazards analyzed, the ﬁrst location point in each of the two
components of unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be equal to zero. Thus, we estimate two location points and three
probabilities for the three allowed groups in the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.
15Table 4: Exit from unemployment, after age 60. Model with unobserved heterogeneity control
to Employment to Retirement
Coef. T Stat. Coef. T Stat.
Truncated Unempl. Benefits (dummy) -2.0731 -5.00 -1.9358 -9.46
Un-truncated Unempl. Benefits (dummy) -1.1351 -2.86 -1.3977 -7.68
Unemployment Subsidy (dummy) -1.0664 -5.55 -1.0398 -12.84
Unemployment Benefits (level in e) -0.0006 -1.05 -0, 0007 -2.31
Entitled to Minimum pension (dummy) -0.4545 -1.93 0.2454 2.84
Un-truncated pension rights (in 1,000 e) -0.0375 -1.66 0.0382 4.35
Replacement rate 0.0130 2.24 0.0728 14.03
Change in pension rights (in 1,000 e) 0.2671 2.87 0.1005 2.63
* Age 60 (dummy) 0.0911 0.62 -0.0236 -1.77
* Unemployment < 24 months (dummy) -0.2871 -4.70 -0.1012 -5.49
* with no Unempl. Benefits (dummy) 0.1212 1.61 -0.0960 -3.27
Life-cycle wealth -0.0519 -0.25 0.0875 1.37
Age 60 (dummy) 0.0911 0.62 0.9595 15.84
Age 65 (dummy) -0.3682 -0.84 2.5122 41.29
Age (in years) -0.2501 -4.23 0.3805 19.53
Unemployment = 24 months (dummy) 0.4462 2.36 0.3456 5.40
* With Unempl. Benefits (dummy) 0.3859 1.26 1.6661 18.26
* With Unempl. Benefits & qualified (dummy) 1.5108 5.10 0.2320 2.67
Ln(Unemployment Duration) -0.7235 -12.58 0.5004 15.63
Regional employment growth rate -0.0567 -2.13 -0.0102 -1.27
*with Un. Benefits (dummy) 0.0688 2.17 0.0095 0.85
Qualified worker (dummy) 0.1259 1.18 -0.4238 -10.32
Constant Term -3.6229 -4.10 -12.5615 -22.04
Notes: Likelihood function -145,838.64. Number of observations: 1,071,224. The estimated equations include a time trend,
dummies both for ﬁrm size and for other characteristics of the ﬁrm and the previous job.
5.2 Transitions from unemployment
In this section, we focus on assessing the impact of the economic incentives offered by the unem-
ployment/pension system on the labour transitions of the unemployed. Speciﬁcally, we explore the
variation of behaviour with current income, the level of pension rights and its dynamics, and the
importance of accumulated life-cycle wealth. We also control for age, for the duration of the unem-
ployment spell, for the duration in previous employment and for some of the characteristics of the
worker position (level of qualiﬁcation, type of ﬁrm, sector of activity, etc). Finally, we also control for
the stage of the business cycle during the unemployment spell and for regional, time and individual
ﬁxed effects. Table 4 reproduces a selection of the most important estimation results. They can be
easily summarized: incentives matters. The amount of income available during the unemployment
spell, the opportunity cost of the forgone pension and the erosion of accrued pension rights are all
key predictors of a transition out of unemployment. Other variables such as age, spell duration or the
skill level of the worker also have a relevant impact. We shall now review those ﬁndings in detail.
Current income is one of the key variables reﬂecting the economic incentives experienced by
the unemployed. In our speciﬁcation, we estimate the coefﬁcients of three dummy variables (rows
1 to 3 in table 4) associated with the perception of truncated (from above) contributive unemploy-
ment beneﬁts (Truncated Unempl. Benefits), contributive beneﬁts below the maximum
(Un-truncated Unempl. Benefits), orthecommonunemploymentsubsidy(Unemployment
Subsidy). The variables are, therefore, arranged in a decreasing order of income, being those un-
employed without beneﬁts the reference group. We also measure the marginal effect on behaviour of
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17an additional unit of income (on those whose beneﬁt is within the legislated ceiling and ﬂoor). The
inclusion of several interaction terms, however, makes a direct interpretation of the coefﬁcients dif-
ﬁcult. Instead, we resort to ﬁgures 4 and 5 to illustrate the ﬁndings related to these marginal effects.
The results can be summarized as follows:
² As predicted by the theory of section 2, we ﬁnd a very clear, inverse relation between the
disposable income of the unemployed and the probability of a subsequent change in the labour
state (ie, both in the transition U ! E and U ! R). The monotonicity emerges in both the
comparison across income groups and in the marginal effects.
² Perfect monotonicity is violated in the retirement transition of the unemployed with a duration
of between 20 and 30 months: the retirement hazard in that case peaks among those drawing
the unemployment subsidy (left panel of ﬁgure 5). This effect may be a behavioural reaction to
the fact that, in Spain, the size of the beneﬁt decreases with the duration of the unemployment
spell. When the beneﬁt is downgraded from “Prestaci´ on contributiva” to “Subsidio” (typically
after around 24 months on the jobless roll), the drop in income is especially acute (from 60%
of previous wages to 75% of the minimum wage). This drop may rationalize the high rate of
retirement among workers with a subsidy.
We document some of the direct effects of duration, regardless of its impact on disposable
income. They can be appreciated in the discontinuities in the hazard rates of the unemployed without
beneﬁts in ﬁgures 4 and 5. More generally, the effects reveal themselves in the duration regressors in
table 4 (lines 8 to 5 from the bottom of the table). Longer durations imply a continuous depreciation
of the labour capabilities, resulting in continuously lower reentry rates and higher retirement rates.
At the same time, crossing the two-years threshold leads to a discontinuous jump in retirement but,
also, to higher reentry rates. This clearly points towards a strategic use of the unemployment beneﬁts
by workers and maybe, also, by employers.
The potential income obtained in case of retirement (ie, the pension level) is another key incentive
variable for the unemployed. According to our basic model in section 2, higher pension beneﬁts
increase the opportunity cost of staying unemployed and the implicit reservation wage applied to the
job offers received. Three regressors (lines 5 to 8 from the top in table 4) capture these effects in our
econometric model: a dummy for minimum pensions and two continuous variables reﬂecting the two
main components of the pension formula: the size of the pension rights (“base reguladora”) and the
replacement rate resulting from the age and number of contributed years when the individual retires
(see Appendix A for details). Note that, as we are including a speciﬁc age variable in the model,
our replacement rate variable isolates the effect of longer contributive careers on behaviour.
Our three pension-level variables do not interact with another regressor, making the analysis of the
resulting effects quite straightforward:
² Bigger accrued pension rights are associated with lower reentry rates and higher retirement
rates, as expected. The quantitative importance of the effects is remarkably large.27 We ﬁnd
them to be systematically larger than those associated with the variation in disposable income
described above.
Potential pensions also increases with gains in replacement rates. They arise from either delays
in the retirement age or as a result of longer contributive records. The former effect is captured
by the variable age, which has the expected signs: the older the unemployed, the lower the in-
cidence of reemployment and the larger the incidence of retirement. Obviously, larger pension
income is not the only element underlying this regularity.28 Table 4 shows a strong positive
impact due to the latter effect on both retirement and employment. The impact on retirement
is consistent with the opportunity cost interpretation above, while the impact on reemployment
demands some additional explanation. Our conjecture is that this coefﬁcient is reﬂecting unob-
served factors correlated with a strong attachment to the labour market (revealing themselves
27We compute the income-elasticity of reemployment and retirement behaviour, in accordance with our estimations. Space
constraints make it impossible to reproduce these results here, but they are available from the authors upon request.
28Health, social customs and ad-hoc rules in collective agreements must also be contributing to this outcome.
18in longer working careers, a strong individual propensity to work and good perceived qualities
by employers).
² Finally, being eligible for minimum pensions is estimated to clearly increase the retirement
hazard. This effect has been discussed at length elsewhere in the literature (eg. Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın
and S´ anchez-Mart´ ın (2007)). We also detect a signiﬁcant negative effect in the reemployment
hazard that has received less attention in previous empirical analysis.
The curvature of the life-cycle proﬁle of labour income has important incentive implications
within the context of the Spanish pension rules. If the growth rate of the individual real earnings is
negative when the worker approaches retirement, accrued pension rights can start to decrease. More
precisely, individual pension rights, w(¿), (described in section 2), would suffer a reduction in value
if retirement is delayed. Under those circumstances, the value of the future pension continuously
depreciates if the individual stays unemployed. This depreciation takes the form of a discrete drop
when the duration of the unemployment spell is so long that the contributive unemployment beneﬁt
is substituted with the (much smaller) subsidy. In our analysis, these effects are captured by the re-
gressor Change in pension rights (row 9 in table 4) and its interactions. The main ﬁndings
can be interpreted directly from the estimated coefﬁcients, as follows:
² For the unemployed with less than two years on the jobless roll the data coincide closely with
the theoretical prediction, and we see a negative link between retirement and the change in pen-
sion rights. This factor seems to make an specially important contribution to early retirement
at 60. Besides, we also ﬁnd a negative link with reemployment, implying that workers with
decreasing pension rights are more likely to reenter in the labour force. We ﬁnd an exception
to this in the group of jobless workers that are not currently drawing unemployment beneﬁts. It
may be argued that an indirect signaling mechanism may be operating in this case: the signal
value of an increasing labour income proﬁle may lead to better job offers if it is interpreted as
an indication of quality by the hiring corporations.
² For the long term unemployed, we ﬁnd a very weak (but signiﬁcant) impact on the reentry rates
and an insigniﬁcant effect on retirement. The reentry rate increases with the slope of the labour
income proﬁle, which again hints at some kind of signalling or even strategic effect.
Age is found to be an extremely important predictor of retirement behaviour. This comes as
no surprise. In theory, age is correlated with retirement for biological reasons (changes in health,
in the relative value of leisure or in the capacity to undertake physically demanding jobs) and, more
importantly, due to its interaction with pension regulation. For instance, a peak in retirement at the
Early Retirement Age (60 in Spain) has long been rationalized as the optimal response to credit con-
straints29. The mirror effect on job reentry should be a discrete drop in the observed transitions back
into employment. Secondly, early retirement penalties are progressively reduced as the worker ap-
proaches the normal retirement age of 65. We may, therefore, expect a positive trend in retirement in
the 60/65 age range (and the opposite in reemployment). Finally, 65 is not only the “legal” retirement
age: numerous collective agreements still contain explicit incentives to retire at that particular age. It
is also a “reasonable” retirement age according to commonly accepted social norms.
Our econometric estimations (a continuous age variable and dummies for the ages of 60, 61 and
65, conﬁrm all of the aforementioned effects. Note that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity has
a major impact on the evaluation of the quantitative impact of reaching the age of 65 on retirement.
On top of the independent age-effect described above, the age 65 peak is also the result of a compo-
sition effect in a population of heterogeneous agents. This is clearly revealed in ﬁgure 3 and further
discussed in section 5.1.
According to standard theory, Life-cycle wealth affects behaviour by changing the relative valua-
tion of leisure and income. When leisure is a normal good, an increase in life-cycle wealth decreases
the marginal utility of income and favors a greater consumption of leisure. This naturally leads to ear-
lier retirement and lower reentry rates into employment. In our estimation (table 4), the coefﬁcient on
29With the extra contribution of an insufﬁcient amount of accumulated liquid wealth earlier in the life-cycle. See eg. Borsch-
Supan (2000) or Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın and S´ anchez-Mart´ ın (2007)
19(our proxy of) life-cycle wealth is only weakly signiﬁcant, suggesting that the quantitative
importance of this process is small.
Finally, the sensitivity of labour behaviour to the business cycle is analyzed by exploring its re-
sponsiveness to changes in the growth rate of local employment. The estimated results
(rows 3 and 4 starting from the bottom in table 4) reveal a surprising lack of correlation: retirement
coefﬁcients are statistically insigniﬁcant, while the reentry ones are signiﬁcant but only marginally
so. For the unemployed currently receiving beneﬁts, the reentry rates are estimated to react positively
during cyclical expansions, while the opposite pattern emerges for the unemployed with no income
support. Theoretically, this may imply that the reservation wages grow faster during expansions than
the wages actually offered. We nonetheless ﬁnd the result puzzling and plan to address it in more
detail in future research.
Table 5: Exit from employment, after the age of 60. Model with unobserved heterogeneity control
to Unemployment to Retirement
Coef. t Stat. Coef. t Stat.
Wage (level in e) 0.0669 2.47 -0.0515 -1.28
Entitled to Maximum pension (dummy) -1.1380 -1.55 -0.6596 -1.90
Entitled to Minimum pension (dummy) 0.3747 4.59 0.2373 1.92
* Qualified worker 0.0632 0.67 -0.0723 -0.43
Un-truncated pension rights (in 1,000 e) 0.1086 7.93 0.1590 10.12
* Age -0.0118 -6.90 -0.0124 -7.88
Replacement rate 0.0195 5.51 0.0440 7.87
Change in pension rights (in 1,000 e) 0.0269 0.38 -0.1404 -1.75
* Age 65 (dummy) 0.1454 1.11 -0.1818 -4.73
* Age 0.0041 0.45 0.0267 3.18
Life-cycle Wealth -0.0421 -0.79 -0.1461 -1.97
Age 60 (dummy) -0.0517 -0.91 1.9405 18.56
Age 62 (dummy) 0.1458 2.89 -0.5354 -5.25
Age 63 (dummy) 0.4767 8.31 -0.9186 -11.21
Age 65 (dummy) -0.2797 -1.02 2.4982 30.96
Age (in years) 0.0622 2.14 1.1639 37.60
Ln(Employment Duration) -0.3416 -20.13 -0.1692 -6.15
Regional employment growth rate 0.0035 0.36 0.0195 1.31
* Qualified worker -0.0236 -1.83 -0.0544 -2.92
Qualified worker (dummy) -0.4613 -7.68 -0.2298 -2.75
Constant Term -4.5966 -10.31 -17.2405 -26.21
Notes: Likelihood function -145,838.64. Number of observations: 1,071,224. We have included a time trend, ﬁrm size
dummies and other ﬁrm and job characteristics in these equations.
5.3 Transitions from employment
The exit from employment to both unemployment and retirement is estimated with the sample of em-
ployment spells described previously and using the same discrete time, quarterly duration model. The
model speciﬁcation is also very much like the one described in the previous section. Note however,
that there are some differences in the theoretical foundations underpining the empirical model. On
the one hand, the transition from employment into retirement is conceptually similar to the volun-
tary actions of the unemployed previously analyzed. In that case, the background theory is the same
combination of economic incentives (current income, opportunity cost, life-cycle wealth, etc) and
individual value of leisure (broadly understood) reviewed in section 2. Unsurprisingly, the resulting
20regression speciﬁcation (Table 5) parallels that estimated in section 5.3 (Table 4). On the other hand,
the interests of the employing corporations play a far more important role in the transition into un-
employment of the individuals in our sample. Firings and dismissals are clearly beyond the sphere of
control of the individual, responding to the ﬁrms’ need for adjustment to changes in the competitive
environment, the business cycle or the technical conditions of production. Deriving an explicit theory
of optimal corporate decisions exceeds our ambitions in this paper, but our empirical model does
uncover several important predictors of the ﬁring decisions made by ﬁrms. This probably reﬂects
the existence of strategic interactions between the ﬁrms and the workers when deciding the timing of
the exit. For example, companies may choose the age of exit in such a way that the individuals can
go into retirement without suffering permanent drops in their pensions (ie, taking advantage of the
contributive unemployment scheme).30
The overall picture emerging from Table 5 is not very different from our conclusions in the previ-
ous section: behaviour is highly inﬂuenced by the economic incentives faced by the individual. The
size of the transition ﬂows from employment are much smaller than from unemployment (section
3.2), but the determinants of these ﬂows are, once again, strongly correlated with the economic op-
portunities available for the agents. Furthermore, corporations do seem to coordinate the timing of
their ﬁrings with the provisions of the unemployment rules. The next paragraphs review in detail the
determinants of the transitions into retirement and into unemployment.
Direct transitions from employment into retirement are far less common in our sample than
those involving unemployment, but the sensitivity to economic incentives is remarkably similar:
² The marginal effect of an additional unit of labour income (variable wage in row 1 of table
5) is estimated to have a negative impact on retirement (as predicted by theory), although
the effect is not very signiﬁcant. This is not very different from what we estimated for the
unemployed. At the same time, the regression results provide some other indirect evidence
supporting an important role for the size of job earnings. First, the broad classiﬁcation implied
by the dummies on minimum/maximum pension does hint at a monotone negative relation
between earnings and retirement (see below). Secondly, life-cycle wealth has a negative impact
on retirement (in contrast with the ﬁndings for the unemployed). This may also be capturing
a stronger attachment to the labour market by high income workers. The estimation results
provide some extra indirect evidence of the importance of other job characteristics. Qualiﬁed
and stable occupations in particular (with the latter measured by the duration in the current
employmentspell) are associated with a signiﬁcantly smaller incidence ofvoluntaryretirement.
² The opportunity cost implied by the pension available in the case of retirement has a stronger
quantitative effect. As with the unemployed, we report two independent contributors to the
ﬁnal size of the old-age pension: accrued pension rights and its replacement rate. The former (
Un-truncated pension rights in table 5 ) has a strong effect, although its inﬂuence
decreases with age. The latter (replacement rates) is correlated with age and with the
length of the contributive career. Both coefﬁcients are positive and clearly signiﬁcant. Finally,
we include speciﬁc dummies to control for the impact of minimum and maximum pensions.
The theory predicts an unequivocal negative effect of minimum pension on employment and
a more mixed effect for maximum pension.31 The empirical results conﬁrm that minimum
pensions push low-qualiﬁed workers out of employment, while maximum pensions have the
opposite effect (which probably reﬂects more general advantages of high-earnings jobs).
30Logically, this is assuming that the ﬁring responds to a long-term planning rather than to a quick adjustment forced by
unexpected shocks. Note also that after the changes in the pension law introduced in 2002, all future transitions into retirement
prior to the Normal Retirement Age will necessarily involve a six-month spell of unemployment (or participating in some
of the new, ad-hoc programs of “partial retirement”). Section 6 offers a ﬁrst look at the effect of the 2002 reform using a
difference-in-difference approach. Understanding the interactions between ﬁrms and workers, in any case, will be increasingly
important in the future.
31Minimum pensions have three effects, all aligned with earlier retirement: they increase income in retirement, increase life-
cycle wealth and eliminate the possibility of increasing the future pension by staying employed. Maximum pensions foster
earlier retirement by preventing future pension gains, but the other two effects work in the opposite direction (they reduce both
income in retirement and life-cycle wealth).
21² The curvature of the life-cycle proﬁle of labour income also shows the expected negative
correlation predicted by the theory (workers with a decreasing income proﬁle tend to retire
more to avoid the depreciation of their accrued pension rights). The effect is more important at
earlier ages, with the exception of the normal retirement age of 65.
² Age effects are very strong and remarkably similar to those found for the unemployed. Our
discussion there still applies to the employed, with the additional observation that age is likely
to have an important role in the coordination of the actions of employees and employers. The
latter are likely to choose the key legal ages (60 and 65) to ﬁre workers bound for a direct tran-
sition into retirement. For most workers, however, a long stay in the unemployment program is
more likely. In that case, the key ages for dismissal are 58-59 and 62-63, two years in advance
of the legal ages. This conjecture is robustly conﬁrmed in Table 5 and also in Table A.3 in the
Appendix. The probability of being separated from the job is considerably higher at these ages
as the worker may combine two years of unemployment beneﬁts and the exit to retirement after
their exhaustion.
² Business cycle effects: as with the unemployed, we do not ﬁnd a strong behavioural reaction
to the changes in the growth rate of the local labour market. Only qualiﬁed workers reveal an
appreciable pro-cyclical reaction to the stage of the business cycle (they retire less when local
employment rates improves).
Turning to the estimated determinants of the transitions into unemployment, we ﬁnd they reveal
some of the logic behind the workforce adjustment by companies. On average, more expensive
workers are ﬁred in greater numbers, but this ﬁnding must be carefully qualiﬁed. Note ﬁrst that the
risk of redundancy is clearly smaller for qualiﬁed workers. Secondly, low income workers (entitled
to minimum pensions) follow the opposite tendency, with an appreciably larger ﬁring risk. Finally,
the stability of the job (which is a combination of the intrinsic characteristics of the position and of
the worker) is a very strong (negative) predictor of the risk of exiting the ﬁrm into unemployment.
Besides, the estimation results conﬁrm a general tendency to ﬁre older workers rather than their
younger counterparts.
A particularly signiﬁcant pattern is the strong peaks in ﬁring found two-years in advance of key
legal retirement ages. Clearly, companies take into account the two-year protection offered by the
public unemployment insurance when deciding the timing of their redundancies. Finally, we ﬁnd
a surprisingly small cyclical correlation of the ﬂows from employment into unemployment. The
estimated coefﬁcients suggest a higher ﬁring rate of qualiﬁed workers during recessions, but the
effects are only marginally signiﬁcant.
Overall, our ﬁndings conﬁrm the general pattern uncovered in the previous sections: economic
incentives matter a lot. The intensity of the dynamics out of employment is smaller (especially into
retirement), but the logic behind them seems to sit comfortably with the prediction of basic economic
theory.
6 Policy evaluation
6.1 Evaluation of the changes in early retirement introduced in the 2002 pen-
sion reform
In 2002, Spain introduced a package of legislative changes affecting the details of the contributive
pension system. The modiﬁcations ranged from relatively minor changes in the pension formula to
a quite substantial reformulation of the pathway into retirement before the normal retirement age. In
the pre-2002 system, the pension beneﬁt was ﬁrst available at the age of 60 (with substantial early-
retirement penalties). After 2002, the early retirement age was delayed to 61 and was made available
only to those workers with at least 6 months on the unemployment rolls.32 Assuming a rational
32The purpose of the reform was to eliminate the possibility of a voluntary early withdrawal from the workforce. On the
face of it, policy-makers were not contemplating the possibility of an strategic use of the unemployment beneﬁt by companies
22reaction by workers and corporations, we may conjecture that these changes would (i) increase the
intensity of retirement ﬂows of unemployed workers (U ! R) at the age of 61; and (ii) increase
the ﬂow of transitions from employment into unemployment (E ! U) at the age of 59.33 This
latter behavioural change reﬂects the strategic use of the unemployment scheme by private agents
in the economy: companies would ﬁre two years in advance of the new early retirement age in the
conﬁdence that, in the meantime, their workers will be well protected by the generous contributive
unemployment beneﬁt.
In this section, we use our econometric model to evaluate the behavioural reaction to an institu-
tional reform undertaken in Spain in 2002. We proceed in three steps: ﬁrst, we identify the parameters
of the model that (according to the theory) should be affected by the reform. We then estimate the
interaction-dummies for those parameters to isolate the behaviour in the post-reform part of the sam-
ple (2002/2008). Finally we check for any signiﬁcant changes in the affected parameters. This is
equivalent to a difference-in-difference approach for the evaluation of the impact of the reform.
Table 6: Double difference test for the 2002 reform
Exit from Employment, without unobserved With
to unemployment, het. controls het. controls
Coef. T Stat. Coef. T Stat.
Age 58 (dummy) 0.2292 5.62 0.2341 5.72
Age 59 (dummy) -0.0368 -0.67 -0.0280 -0.51
Years 2002-2008 (dummy) -0.3962 -10.66 -0.3905 -10.42
2002-2008 £ Age 58 0.3260 5.60 0.3262 5.58
2002-2008 £ Age 59 0.5228 7.09 0.5182 6.99
Table 7: A triple difference test for the 2002 reform
Exit from Unemployment, to employment to retirement
After age 60 Coef. T Stat. Coef. T Stat.
Without unobserved heterogeneity controls
Age 61 (dummy) -0.7252 -2.10 0.6632 2.88
Years 2002-2008 (dummy) -0.3520 -1.31 0.4246 3.23
* Age 61 0.5132 1.27 -0.4936 -1.49
Unempl. > 6 months (dummy) 0.2362 1.12 0.9026 8.89
* Age 61 -0.0423 -0.12 -0.7108 -3.03
* Year 2002-2008 0.0635 0.30 -0.3170 -2.58
Age 61 £ 2002-2008 £ Unempl. > 6 months -0.2001 -0.42 1.0080 2.96
With unobserved heterogeneity controls
Age 61 (dummy) -0.7330 -2.12 0.6231 2.61
Years 2002-2008 (dummy) -0.3358 -1.24 0.2759 1.90
* Age 61 0.5343 1.31 -0.3717 -1.08
Unemplemployment > 6 months (dummy) 0.1779 0.84 0.3748 3.27
* Age 61 0.0072 0.02 -0.3701 -1.52
* Year 2002-2008 0.0661 0.31 -0.1594 -1.19
Age 61 £ 2002-2008 £ Unemployment > 6 months -0.2568 -0.54 0.6674 1.88
Notes: Likelihood function for the model with unobserved heterogeneity, -145,715.11. Number of observations: 1,071,224.
We have included a time trend, ﬁrm size dummies and other ﬁrm and job characteristics in these equations.
and workers.
33Note that, by making a direct transition from employment into retirement impossible, the reform should result in larger
(E ! U) ﬂows and a higher incidence of unemployment at all ages preceding the normal retirement age.
23Table 6 presents the results of this policy evaluation over the transitions from employment to
unemployment before the age of 60. It displays the estimation results when employed workers are
allowedtohavedifferentexitratestounemploymentatages58and59(inordertotestforthestrategic
use of Unemployment Beneﬁts before the age of 61). We present results with and without control for
unobserved heterogeneity. The effect of the reform is captured by the interaction dummies, showing
a large increase in ﬁring rates both at 58 and, especially, at 59 after the reform was implemented, that
is, after 2002. In this particular case, the control of unobserved heterogeneity does not signiﬁcantly
affect the key coefﬁcients representing the reform, evidencing that the reform affects all types of
workers.
Similarly, Table 7 shows the estimated change in the retirement behaviour of the unemployed
after 61. Again we show results without (top panel) and with controls (bottom panel) for unobserved
heterogeneity. The importance of unobserved heterogeneity is much more evident in this case, since
its consideration reduces both the size and the signiﬁcance of most of the coefﬁcients. The impact
of the reform is captured by a triple interaction term (in the last row of the table), deﬁned by the
simultaneous coincidence of being 61 years old, having an unemployment duration of 6 months or
more and being unemployed after 2002. 34 When unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into account
the estimated effect is large and very signiﬁcant: the exit to retirement more than doubled after
2002 for the average worker when compared on a like-to-like basis before 2002. When unobserved
heterogeneity is taken into account the estimated effect is still large and signiﬁcant at 10 percent.
The comparison of the two coefﬁcients reveals that an important fraction of the effect (more than
one third) is explained by the presence in the sample of unemployed workers more prone to take the
retirement option.
6.2 Reform analysis
As a second illustration of the sensitivity of individual behaviour to economic incentives, this section
simulates the consequences of a joint reform of pension and unemployment rules. 35 We consider
a rather extreme thought experiment combining changes in the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts
and changes in the way the pension rights (of the unemployed) are updated. The design of the reform
is intended to emphasize the interaction of pension and unemployment rules in the shaping of the
labour behaviour of older unemployed workers.
We proceed in two steps. First, we modify the treatment of the pension rights of the unemployed
throughout the duration of the unemployment spell. In the current system (see section 2 or table A1 in
appendix A.1), the pensionable income acknowledged by the pension authority for the updating of the
worker’s pension rights is the full wage enjoyed in the preceding employment spell (up to a legislated
maximum). This favorable treatment lasts for up to a maximum of two years, with the minimum
wage replacing the previous wage thereafter. In contrast, in our reformed system the minimum wage
will be used for the updating during the ﬁrst year of unemployment and a zero will be included
for longer durations. This harsh reform makes the unemployment route into retirement appreciably
costlier: on average, the drop in accrued pension rights associated with one extra year unemployed
accelerates from -e1,464 to -e2,703 in our sample. The average level of the accrued pension
rights also falls appreciably (from e11,351 to e11,088 , that is a 2.32% drop). The behavioural
consequences predicted by our model after this institutional change are presented in Table 8. They
are surprisingly small: unemployed workers reemploy at a slightly larger rate (around 3% higher) and
also retire slightly more at 60, the early retirement age. The explanation can be found by inspecting
our estimation results in table 4: the only groups that show a high sensitivity to changes in pension
rights are the short-term unemployed and the unemployed without beneﬁts. The reform has some
effect on the former but hardly any on the latter.
A more comprehensive reform would also modify the amount of cash income provided to the
unemployed. Intuition (and the estimation results in table 4) suggests that workers would be more
34We do not model the additional requirement of having contributed for at least 30 years because in our sample above 97%
of the unemployed workers meet the criteria.
35The standard caveats associated with the use of reduced-form models for policy evaluation should be applied to our results.
Clearly, a more structural econometric approach would be better suited to this endeavour. In any case, we believe our ﬁndings
are a good illustrative approximation of the results of the reform.
24responsive to changes in this dimension. To test this conjecture we consider a second institutional
change on top of the modiﬁcations in the dynamics of pension rights discussed above. In this second
step we make the contributive beneﬁts available only during the ﬁrst year in the program (compared
to the two years currently available), followed by the provision of the unemployment subsidy if the
spell extends between one and two years. Longer durations will not be covered by the unemployment
program (compared with the unrestricted provision of the unemployment subsidy until retirement
in the current system). Table 9 presents the prediction of our model in this new environment. The
behavioural response to the joint reform is signiﬁcant. The hazard rates corresponding to transitions
back into the workforce and transitions out of the labour force (into retirement) record similar in-
creases ranging between 15 and 19%. In the absence of changes in the labour market conditions,
these ﬁgures reﬂect an institutionally induced change in the propensity to accept job offers and in the
willingness to transit into retirement via unemployment. All in all, our results are a sound conﬁrma-
tion of the power of economic incentives and of the importance of the joint consideration of pension
and unemployment rules in policy design (targeted at older workers).
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyze the labour market transitions of workers approaching retirement in Spain,
paying special attention to their responsiveness to the ﬁnancial incentives implicit in public regula-
tions. We study the individual transitions of employees and unemployed workers, assuming retire-
ment to be an absorbing state. We emphasize the importance of the exit route via unemployment,
given its large quantitative incidence among Spanish workers (accounting for more than 2/3 of the
transitions into retirement) The incidence of this alternative exit route is already large in many Euro-
pean countries, and likely to have an increasing presence after the latest cyclical recession. Note, for
example, that Coile and Levine (2009) estimate the increase in retirement attributable to the rising
unemployment rate in US to be almost 50 percent larger than the decrease brought about by the asso-
ciated stock market crash. More generally, the recent macroeconomic developments emphasize the
importance (for policy purposes) of getting a better understanding of the dependence of labour deci-
sions on unemployment and pension rules. Pension reforms are being ubiquitously ushered in OECD
countries for budgetary reasons, with very little understanding of their labor supply consequences.
This investigations contributes to throw some light on this important subject.
Our empirical strategy is based on the joint estimation of two multi-state, discrete time, duration
models (for the exit from employment and unemployment). The regressors considered in each model
includethedisposableincome(inthecurrentandalternativelabourstates), thesizeofaccruedpension
rightsandtheir change withthe durationof thecurrent spell. These variablesare carefullyconstructed
to capture the fundamental economic incentives generated by pension and unemployment rules. The
estimation uses a new data set based on administrative records from the Spanish Social Security
adminstration ( Muestra Continua de Vidas laborales). This new database provides the entire labour
history of the workers in the sample. Thanks to this feature, we can control for the unobserved
heterogeneity in the sample in our estimation exercise.
Our ﬁndings contribute to the previous literature in several ways. First, our estimation results
clearly reinforce previous evidence on the inﬂuence of institutional incentives on individual be-
haviour. In particular, we ﬁnd strong cross-effects between the two insurance systems coexisting
at older ages: unemployment regulations are extremely important for the timing of retirement, while
pension rules have strong effects on the transitions between employment and unemployment. A nat-
ural corollary is that the small reentry rates observed in Spain among workers aged 55 or over are, at
least in part, a consequence of an institutional design that subsidizes non-participation over the costly
alternative of job seeking. The combination of generous Unemployment Beneﬁts (for durations of
up to two years), and substantial penalties for early retirement make unemployment a very attractive
alternative for a large fraction of the sample. The same effect reveals itself in the high retirement rates
observed among unemployed workers once UB beneﬁts are no longer available.
The paper also explores the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in the assessment of the impor-
tance of ﬁnancial incentives. We ﬁnd that assuming a homogeneous population leads to rather large
estimation biases in the key parameters of the model (and, consequently, in the result of policy ex-
25Table 8: Reform Analysis (i): change in pension rights (effect measured over quarterly hazard rates)
Exit from Unemployment
to Employment to Retirement
Age baseline simulated difference baseline simulated difference
60 0.657 0.678 +3.20% 5.605 5.694 +1.59%
61 0.480 0.495 +3.15% 3.395 3.369 -0.75%
62 0.368 0.380 +3.16% 4.671 4.639 -0.70%
63 0.282 0.291 +3.17% 6.293 6.252 -0.64%
64 0.214 0.221 +3.18% 8.268 8.220 -0.58%
65 0.081 0.084 +3.32% 34.085 33.961 -0.36%
66 0.122 0.126 +3.21% 13.152 13.091 -0.46%
67 0.092 0.095 +3.22% 15.974 15.908 -0.41%
68 0.069 0.071 +3.23% 19.045 18.973 -0.38%
Table 9: Reform Analysis (ii): simultaneous change in pension rights and Unemployment beneﬁts
(effect measured over quarterly hazard rates)
Exit from Unemployment
to Employment to Retirement
Age baseline simulated difference baseline simulated difference
60 0.657 0.782 +18.95% 5.605 6.568 +17.20%
61 0.480 0.573 +19.37% 3.395 3.958 +16.59%
62 0.368 0.439 +19.16% 4.671 5.396 +15.51%
63 0.282 0.335 +18.91% 6.293 7.188 +14.22%
64 0.214 0.254 +18.66% 8.268 9.325 +12.79%
65 0.081 0.094 +15.18% 34.085 36.831 +8.06%
66 0.122 0.145 +18.23% 13.152 14.468 +10.00%
67 0.092 0.108 +18.04% 15.974 17.404 +8.95%
68 0.069 0.081 +17.76% 19.045 20.620 +8.27%
26periments). The sensitivity of behaviour to current disposable income, for instance, is signiﬁcantly
underestimated if the underlying heterogeneity is omitted. More strikingly, unobserved heterogene-
ity seem to be responsible for more than half the size of the peaks in retirement hazards observed at
60 and 65, for both employed and unemployed workers. The usual interpretation of these peaks as
a reaction to the details of the pension rules is, consequently, an overstatement of the sensitivity to
incentives.
Finally, we complete our assessment of the importance of the incentive effects with a couple of
policy evaluations. First, we use our estimated model to explore the consequences of a reform in
the early retirement rules implemented in Spain in 2002. Using a difference-in-difference approach
we ﬁnd a sizable increase in the incidence of retirement at the new early retirement age (61) among
affected workers. Employers also seem to have reacted strategically to the change (by appreciably in-
creasing the ﬁring rates two-years in advance of the new early retirement age). In a second simulation
we evaluate the effects of a thought-experiment involving a ﬁrm tightening of pension/unemployment
rules. We simulate a shortening of the time that unemployment beneﬁts are available and a reduction
in the pace of accrual of pension rights during the unemployment spell. These changes lead to sharp
increases in predicted reemployment and retirement hazard rates, with gains ranging between 10 and
20% of the initial hazard, depending on age.
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29Appendix
A Spanish Social Protection programs
A.1 Spanish Old-Age pension rules
The public old-age pension system is the largest welfare program in Spain, absorbing almost 40%
of the total social protection expenditure (50% when including the disability and survivor programs),
and representing around 8% of the GDP in 2009. The system is of the Pay As You Go, Deﬁned
Beneﬁt type. It provides ﬁve types of contributory pensions (old age, disability, widows and widow-
ers, orphans and other relatives), and is organized around three basic schemes: the General Regime
(private sector employees and some public servants), the Central Government civil servants scheme,
and some Special Regimes, with the Self-employed Scheme being the most important one. In this
paper we deal with the old age pensions paid by the General Regime, accounting for around 74 % of
the total.
Financing: The System is ﬁnanced through contributions from employers and employees. Contribu-
tions are a ﬁxed proportion of gross labour income between an upper and a lower limit (contribution
bases), which are annually ﬁxed and vary according to the professional category. The current contri-
bution rates are 23.6 and 4.7 %, for employers and employees, respectively.
Pension formula: Eligibility requires a minimum of 15 of contributions and complete withdrawal
from the labour force. The initial amount is obtained by multiplying a beneﬁt base and a replacement
rate. The beneﬁt base is a moving average of the individual’s contribution bases in the 8 years
immediately prior to retirement (15 after the 1997 system). The replacement rate depends on age
and the number of years of contributions. An individual receives 100% of the beneﬁt base when
retiring at the age of 65 (Normal Retirement Age, ¿N) having contributed for more than 35 years. It
is possible to start collecting the pension at the Early Retirement Age (ERA, 60 in Spain) under a
40% penalty on the beneﬁt base. This corresponds to an 8% annual penalty for bringing forward the
retirement age (7% with 40 years of contribution after 1997).36 There is also a penalty for insufﬁcient
contributions (2 % of the beneﬁt base per year below 35 years) The purchasing power of the initial
beneﬁt is kept constant according to the evolution of the CPI.
Minimum and maximum pensions: There are lower and upper limits on the pension beneﬁt. Their
values in 2000 were roughly equal to and four times the minimum wage, respectively. The minimum
pension varies when there is a dependent spouse and/or with age brackets, since it is higher for
individuals over 65. They are compatible with early retirement, as they can be awarded immediately
after the ERA. In 1999 almost 35% of pensions were topped up to the guaranteed minimum (23.7%
in the General Regime), while the incidence of maximum pensions was much lower. Historically the
behaviour of both limits, which are annually ﬁxed by the government, has been very different: while
maximum pensions have been kept roughly constant in real terms over the last 15 years, minimum
pensions have grown at approximately the same rate as nominal wages. As a result of this policy, the
minimum pension (for married individuals aged 65+) is higher than the legislated Minimum Wage
since 2000, and their values have continued to diverge ever since.
The 2002 Pension Reform:
The 2002 Pension Reform, passed in 2001, introduced a few changes in the conditions for early
and postponed retirement.
Early Retirement The 2002 reform changed the requirements for early retirement as from the
age of 61 for those workers that started contributing after January, 1st, 1967 (those who started
contributing before that date can still retire at 60):
² Aged 61+
² Having contributed at least 30 years
36A further reduction of this penalty for very long contributive careers came into force in 2002.
30² Involuntary loss of former job
² Being unemployed for at least for six months








- 30 8 %
Postponing retirement The 2002 reform introduced a premium for postponing retirement beyond
65 for those workers with at least 35 years of contributions:
®(¿) =
n
1 + :02(¿ ¡ 65); if 65 · ¿ and a(¿) ¸ 35;
where a denotes age and n denotes years of contribution.
Table A1. Stylized version of the Spanish General Regime pension rules, 1997-2002 systems
Provision Expression Deﬁnitions
¿m is the early retirement age
Eligibility ¿ ¸ ¿m = 60(61after 2002) a(¿) ¸ 15 a(.) denotes
years of contributions
cx;cm are respectively the
Covered wages c(t) = minfcx(t);maxfw(t);cm(t)gg Max and Min. covered wage
c(t) denotes contributions
Pension rights w(¿) is the beneﬁt base
(Beneﬁt Base) w(¿) = (1=R)
P¿
¿¡R c(t)dt R: length of the averaging
period (15 in 2002)




®0 if ¿ < ¿m
®0 + ®1(¿ ¡ ¿m) if ¿m · ¿ · ¿N
1 otherwise
¿N is the normal retirement age
®0 = :60
®1 = :08




·0 if a(¿) < 15




b(t;¿) is the pre-tax pension
Pension B(t;¿) = minfBM(t);maxf®(¿)·(a(¿))w(¿);Bm(t;¿)gg BM is the maximum pension
Bm is the minimum pension
Further Maximum contributions and pensions are constant in real terms
assumptions The minimum pension real growth rate or generosity is 0.5 %.
A.2 Unemployment beneﬁts
Unemployment beneﬁts are generally conditional on previous spells of contributions and are available
onlyforworkersintheGeneralRegimeoftheSpanishSocialSecuritysystem.37 Thedurationofthese
beneﬁts depends upon the spells of previous contributions. The maximum duration is 24 months,
37People enrolled in any of the Special Regimes either have no access to unemployment beneﬁts (self-employed and house-
hold employees) or have special unemployment programs (farmers and ﬁshermen).
31which is achieved after 6 years of contributions. The replacement rate varies with the duration of the
spells in two steps: 70% for the ﬁrst 6 months and 60% for the remainder of the contributory spell,
up to 24 months. The beneﬁts have a minimum and maximum amount, both of them varying with the
number of dependant children. While unemployed and receiving contributory beneﬁts, workers keep
contributing to the pension at the same rate as they were contributing in their prior employment.
There are two continuation programs for those who have exhausted their entitlement to contribu-
tory unemployment beneﬁts: one for those aged 45+ (UB45+ program) and the other for those aged
52+ (UB52+ program). The latter is a special subsidy for unemployed people over 52, who lack other
income sources, have contributed to unemployment insurance for at least 6 years in their life and,
except for age, satisfy all the requirements for an old-age pension. Those in the UB52+ program keep
contributing towards the pension but at the minimum contributory base.
B Estimation results with and without Unobserved heterogene-
ity
The most important contribution this paper makes is the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity in the
examination of the behavioural impact of ﬁnancial incentives. In this section we check the relevance
of this contribution by comparing the estimation results with and without unobserved heterogeneity.
This is done by matching Table 4 with Table A5, and Table 5 with Table A6, and by comparing the
aggregate hazard predicted by the two models (Figures 6). The comparison of both the estimated
coefﬁcients for the set of incentive variables and the graphs suggests that the main consequences of
omitting unobserved heterogeneity appear in the exit into retirement, from both unemployment and
employment.
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A priori, one would expect that the omission of one unobserved determinant may artiﬁcially
32change the estimated effect of the economic incentives. Normally, we would expect the bias to be
positive (with the omitted effect being erroneously attributed to the observable incentive variable).
The discussion about the causes of early retirement in the Introduction is a clear illustration of such
a situation. However, the opposite bias is also possible, when the correct impact of an incentive
variable is measured only once, the correct speciﬁcation is considered. In this case we seem to have
both situations:
² Taking proper account of unobservable characteristics we ﬁnd a clearly diminished impact of
the pension level and the dynamics of the pension rights in retirement decisions. Similarly,
the effect of life-cycle income reveals a less signiﬁcant effect in this case. What is really
important is that our estimations conﬁrm a very relevant role for economic incentives as ex-
planatory variables for labour transitions, even when composition effects are accounted for (we
are comparing similar individuals, not only in terms of their observed characteristics but also
controlling for unobserved ones).
² In the exit from employment to retirement, in contrast, we ﬁnd that the effect of minimum
pensions changes from being negative to positive (although not very signiﬁcant), once unob-
served heterogeneity is properly controlled. Thus, those with access to minimum pensions
show a slightly larger probability of retiring, comparing individuals with the same value for
unobserved heterogeneity. This is a clear conﬁrmation of the theory and previous econometric
studies.
² Figure 6 shows how the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity results in large differences in the
average estimated hazard rates into retirement at the age of 60, for unemployed workers, and
at age 65, for both employed and unemployed workers. This is a very important new stylized
fact for this ﬁeld of the literature: the peaks in the average hazard are substantially smaller
(mainly in the exit from employment) once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. Hence,
the simple empirical hazard rates usually found elsewhere in the literature are largely the result
of a composition effect.
Finally, the same graph shows that unobserved heterogeneity does not change the shape by
age of the hazard rates from both unemployment to employment and from employment to
unemployment, although the average level of the hazards is slightly larger once unobserved
heterogeneity is controlled for.
Overall, our results suggest that the importance of a proper treatment of unobserved heterogeneity
cannot be overemphasized, at least in this particular branch of the literature.
33Table A2. Initial Conditions
With Unobs. heterog. Without Unobs. heterog.
Coef. T Stat. Coef. T Stat.
Life-Cycle Income 0.1198 30.18 0.1193 30.34
Age (in years) -0.2883 -48.62 -0.2830 -48.53
Number of previous unempl. spells -0.4787 -58.96 -0.4707 -59.11
Part time job (dummy) 1.0768 7.84 1.0573 7.79
Regional employment growth rate 0.0679 15.29 0.0680 15.49
Qualified worker (dummy) -0.5201 -15.11 -0.5193 -15.28
Constant Term 0.4314 6.40 0.5987 9.49
Notes: Estimation with no unobserved heterogeneity control: Likelihood function -15,473.74. Number of observations:
42,117. We have included a time trend, ﬁrm size dummies and other ﬁrm and job characteristics in these equations.
Table A3. Exit from Unemployment, before the age of 60
With Unobs. het. Without Unobs. het.
Coef. T Stat. Coef. T Stat.
With Unempl. Benefits, Un-truncated (dummy) -0.4435 -3.91 -0.3827 -3.44
With Unempl. Benefits, truncated (dummy) -2.2183 -19.36 -2.1382 -19.15
Unempl. Subsidy (dummy) -1.8961 -26.89 -1.8207 -26.55
Unempl. Benefits (level in e) -0.0015 -9.18 -0.0015 -9.28
% Penalization for early retirement 0.0397 10.88 0.0387 10.81
Change in pension rights (in 1,000 e) 0.3274 11.97 0.3247 12.04
* Unemployment < 24 months (dummy) -0.1903 -10.43 -0.1869 -10.29
* with no Unempl. Benefits (dummy) 0.0793 3.11 0.0724 2.90
Life-Cycle Income 0.3877 7.41 0.3759 7.36
Age 58 (dummy) -0.2522 -4.20 -0.2422 -4.06
Age 59 (dummy) -0.4310 -5.56 -0.4116 -5.35
Age (in years) -0.1480 -21.76 -0.1431 -21.45
Unemployment = 24 months (dummy) 0.3671 6.03 0.3668 6.06
* With Unempl. Benefits (dummy) 0.7803 9.11 0.7758 9.10
* With Unempl. Benefits & qualified (dummy) 1.2192 15.74 1.2225 15.91
Ln(Unemployment Duration) -0.5379 -25.37 -0.5570 -26.68
Regional employment growth rate 0.0242 4.75 0.0234 4.65
Qualified worker (dummy) -0.2146 -5.93 -0.2178 -6.15
Constant Term -6.8993 -18.76 -6.5780 -18.29
Notes: Estimation with no unobserved heterogeneity control: Likelihood function -21,526.07. Number of observations:
197,342. We have included a time trend, ﬁrm size dummies and other ﬁrm and job characteristics in these equations.
34Table A4. Exit from Employment, before the age of 60
With Unobs. heterog. Without Unobs. heterog.
Coef. T Stat. Coef. T Stat.
Wage -0.0697 -4.64 -0.0824 -5.55
% Penalization for early retirement 0.0271 12.07 0.0269 12.11
Change in pension rights (in 1,000 e) 0.0437 3.21 0.0455 3.38
* Qualified worker -0.0488 -3.02 -0.0487 -3.05
* Age 0.0057 2.01 0.0054 1.91
Life-Cycle Income -0.7490 -20.02 -0.7319 -19.84
* Qualified worker 0.3181 7.05 0.3421 7.67
Age 58 (dummy) 0.3471 10.01 0.3425 9.91
Age 59 (dummy) 0.1711 3.87 0.1648 3.74
Age (in years) 0.0653 9.96 0.0624 9.58
* Qualified worker 0.0069 1.03 0.0079 1.17
Ln(Empl. Dur.) -0.5255 -63.98 -0.5312 -65.45
Regional employment growth rate -0.0334 -7.10 -0.0324 -6.94
* Qualified worker 0.0211 3.33 0.0175 2.79
Qualified worker (dummy) -0.1354 -3.78 -0.1136 -3.21
Constant Term -4.8264 -20.82 -4.6644 -20.40
Notes: Estimation with no unobserved heterogeneity control: Likelihood function -55,797.87. Number of observations:
667,085. We have included a time trend, ﬁrm size dummies and other ﬁrm and job characteristics in these equations.
Table A5. Exit from unemployment, after the age of 60. Model without unobserved heterogeneity
control
to Employment to Retirement
Coef. T Stat. Coef. T Stat.
Truncated Unempl. Benefits (dummy) -2.0161 -4.88 -1.7849 -9.37
Un-truncated Unempl. Benefits (dummy) -0.9259 -2.35 -0.2072 -1.33
Unempl. Subsidy (dummy) -0.9997 -5.23 -0.6246 -10.37
Unempl. Benefits (level in e) -0.0008 -1.25 -0.0014 -5.30
Entitled to Minimum pension (dummy) -0.4651 -1.98 0.1410 2.31
Un-truncated pension rights (in 1,000 e) -0.0332 -1.47 0.0384 14.78
Replacement rate 0.0092 1.64 0.0725 9.58
Change in pension rights (in 1,000 e) 0.3043 3.28 0.3552 10.44
* Age 60 (dummy) -0.0342 -0.77 -0.2200 -22.55
* Unemployment < 24 months (dummy) -0.2972 -4.87 -0.1097 -8.28
* with no Unempl. Benefits (dummy) 0.1163 1.55 -0.1144 -4.80
Life-cycle wealth -0.0684 -0.33 -0.0775 -1.64
Age 60 (dummy) 0.1033 0.70 1.2603 26.45
Age 65 (dummy) -0.4311 -0.98 2.1134 41.33
Age (in years) -0.2689 -4.55 0.1671 11.15
Unemployment = 24 months (dummy) 0.4736 2.51 0.5783 11.01
* With Un. Benefits (dummy) 0.3797 1.24 1.2597 16.34
* With Un. Benefits & qualified (dummy) 1.5066 5.11 0.3418 4.44
Ln(Un. Duration) -0.7814 -13.71 0.1657 7.13
Regional employment growth rate -0.0535 -2.02 -0.0070 -1.11
*with Un. Benefits (dummy) 0.0666 2.11 0.0310 3.33
Qualified worker (dummy) 0.1256 1.18 -0.5025 -17.31
Constant Term -2.8254 -3.26 -8.4361 -26.41
Notes: Likelihood function -26,151.45. Number of observations: 69,992. The estimated equations include a time trend,
dummies for ﬁrm size and for other characteristics of the ﬁrm and the previous job.
35Table A6. Exit from employment, after the age of 60. Model without unobserved heterogeneity
control
to Unemployment to Retirement
Coef. t Stat. Coef. t Stat.
Wage (level in e) 0.0657 2.48 -0.0667 -2.28
Entitled to Maximum pension (dummy) -1.2094 -1.65 -1.0262 -3.93
Entitled to Minimum pension (dummy) 0.3484 4.36 -0.2426 -2.42
* Qualified worker 0.0634 0.69 -0.1286 -0.98
Un-truncated pension rights (in 1,000 e) 0.1094 8.08 0.1785 13.22
* Age -0.0122 -7.17 -0.0168 -13.35
Replacement rate 0.0185 5.32 0.0290 7.00
Change in pension rights (in 1,000 e) 0.0275 0.39 -0.1790 -2.56
* Age 65 (dummy) 0.1400 1.07 -0.1990 -6.29
* Age 0.0038 0.42 0.0308 4.17
Life-cycle Wealth -0.0693 -1.33 -0.4255 -6.95
Age 60 (dummy) -0.0671 -1.19 0.5468 6.77
Age 62 (dummy) 0.1523 3.03 -0.9858 -10.26
Age 63 (dummy) 0.4973 8.69 -0.8914 -11.17
Age 65 (dummy) -0.3143 -1.15 2.7724 47.35
Age (in years) 0.0433 1.50 0.6926 31.44
Ln(Empl. Dur.) -0.3451 -20.68 -0.1486 -6.40
Regional employment growth rate 0.0028 0.29 0.0156 1.19
* Qualified worker -0.0226 -1.78 -0.0413 -2.55
Qualified worker (dummy) -0.4514 -7.66 -0.3488 -4.78
Constant Term -4.0726 -9.33 -11.6056 -23.42
Notes: Likelihood function -28,327.10. Number of observations: 136,805. We have included a time trend, ﬁrm size
dummies and other ﬁrm and job characteristics in these equations.
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